THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR OF EXHAUSTION:
THE RESULT OF THE PARADOXICAL TRINITY

A Monograph

by

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Infantry

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This monograph analyzes the Iran-Iraq War to determine the role of society--the government, the people, and the army--in forming a state's strategy and action in war. It applies the writings of two classical theorists--Clausewitz and Delbruck--to explain why the war ended the way it did.

First, the theories of Clausewitz and Delbruck are explained to establish the theoretical framework for the monograph. Next, Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" is used to analyze each antagonists strategic development during the course of the war. After that analysis, Delbruck's theory of annihilation and exhaustion is used to determine how each nation's strategy resulted in the operational stalemate.

This monograph concludes that the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates the inextricable link between the paradoxical trinity of a state and that state's strategy and actions in war. This analysis also suggests several conclusions concerning Delbruck's two strategies. First, in a strategy of annihilation, the army is the critical component of the trinity. And, second, in
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: THE RESULT OF THE PARADOXICAL TRINITY by
Major Michael D. Barbero, USA, 57 pages.

This monograph analyzes the Iran-Iraq War to determine
the role of society--the government, the people, and the
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of annihilation, the army is the critical component of the
trinity. And, second, in a strategy of exhaustion, the
people are the most significant component of the trinity.

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I INTRODUCTION

In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran along a 450-mile front. The President of Iraq expected a relatively swift and decisive victory over a weakened and divided opponent. However, by November the war had evolved into a static, stalemated conflict.

A protracted stalemate was not envisioned. For, as conventional wisdom predicted:

> When Saddam Hussein launched his combined ground and air attack on Iran ... experts in many quarters regarded Iraqi success as inevitable. Certain analysts went so far as to predict that the Iraqi blitzkrieg would crush Iranian resistance within a week, two at the most. But instead of a swift war of maneuver, the contest between Iran and Iraq has turned into something more like a medieval siege.[1]

The question is, what went wrong?

The smoldering enmity between Iran and Iraq, fueled by the Iranian Revolution, exploded into war. Iraq's primary war aim was to topple the Khomeini regime. It hoped to accomplish this goal by achieving a quick, decisive and overwhelming military victory. After recovering from the surprise invasion, Iran's chief war aim was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. It sought to do this by wearing down Iraq over time through a strategy of exhaustion. In the end, neither belligerent achieved his objective. When the ceasefire was finally accepted in July 1988, both nations resembled two bloodied, exhausted boxers who, having fought to an inconclusive draw, couldn't answer the bell.

Neither belligerent anticipated or desired a stalemate. Eight years of carnage should have produced more than exhaustion and despair. Obviously something was very wrong in each side's calculations. This monograph seeks the answer in the writings of two classical theorists. In doing so, the paper hopes to explain why the war ended as it did and, by validating theory, provide some insight for future pre-war calculations. It analyzes the war to determine the role of society--the people, the government, and the army-- in forming a state's strategy and actions in war. The analytical framework is provided by the works of two men: the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz and the German military historian, Hans Delbruck.

Clausewitz contends that war is a product of the "paradoxical trinity"[2] of the people, the army, and the government. The variable relationship between these three components is unique in every case giving war a "chameleon-like" quality. The relative dominance of one of the legs of the trinity determines the strategy that a nation will pursue in war.

Delbruck, a student of Clausewitz, proposes that the strategy resulting from the relationship within the trinity takes one of two forms: a strategy of annihilation or a strategy of exhaustion. The strategy of annihilation achieves victory by decisively defeating the enemy army in battle alone. The strategy of exhaustion defeats the enemy by wearing him down through a variety of actions.

The methodology needed to answer the research question is clear. First, the theories of these two men will be explained in order to establish the theoretical framework for the monograph. Next, Clausewitz's trinity will be used to analyze each antagonist's strategic development during the course of the war. After that analysis, Delbruck's theory of annihilation and exhaustion will be used to determine how each nation's strategy resulted in operational stalemate. And, finally, appropriate conclusions will be drawn from the analysis.

II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Clausewitz proposed that war cannot be considered solely in its military setting. Accordingly, he sought to analyze war in its political and social context. This, he states, gives war a chameleon-like property "that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case [and] as a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity"[3] composed of the people, the army, and the government (see figure, page 41).

The people operate in the realm of passion and emotion and represent a "blind natural force [characterized by] primordial violence, hatred, and enmity."[4] This natural force is the basis for national will and fuels war. While it supports or alters government policy, if unrestrained it leads to extremes.

The second part of the trinity is the government which operates within the domain of reason and rational thought. It is the counter force to passion and chance. It establishes the goals and objectives of war and defines the national interest. It also acts to moderate and direct the passion of the people. But, if the government's policy is unrestrained by the people and the army it will establish unattainable goals.

The army operates in the realm of chance, uncertainty and friction--the climate of war. The success of the army determines the fate of the government and the people. If unrestrained by government or the people, the army will seek victory at all costs.

The relationship between the three factors is clear: "the three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another"[5]. The nature of the war, therefore, is colored by this varied relationship. The intensity of the components, their relative dominance within the trinity, and their relationship to the enemy determine the strategy and course of the war.

Hans Delbruck was a military historian and a serious student of Clausewitz. Accordingly, he sought to analyze war within its political and social context and clearly agreed with Clausewitz's proposition that war must be studied as an extension of politics by other means. In placing war in its political and social context, Delbruck

supports Clausewitz's theory that the nature of war is dependent on the "paradoxical trinity."

Delbruck attributes the development of 'his" two strategies to Clausewitz. And while Clausewitz was the "true discoverer of the truth that there are two different forms of strategy ... it was in my [Delbruck's] capacity as historian I easily developed the statements of Clausewitz, the military philosopher, with the historical facts at hand in the direction that Clausewitz undoubtedly had in mind."[6]

Within the framework of Clausewitz's philosophy, Delbruck's historical analysis revealed two forms of strategy which dominate "all strategic thought and action"[7]--the strategy of annihilation, and the strategy of exhaustion.

The strategy of annihilation, or niederwerfunges-strategie, has the decisive battle as its sole aim, its single pole. In this form of warfare, "to which Clausewitz has devoted the book On War"[8], its first principle is "to assemble one's forces, seek out the main force of the enemy, defeat it, and follow up the victory until the defeated side subjects itself to the will of the victor and accepts his conditions."[9]

The conduct of war in this manner requires sufficient superiority to prevail in battle. Delbruck allows that while this superiority may only ensure victory in the first decisive battle it may be insufficient to take-over the entire country. The key components of this strategy are the

role of battle and the responsibility of the commander. The role of battle is paramount; "the destruction of the enemy fighting force by battle ... the only valid goal."[10] The commander applies his forces in such a way that ensures the most decisive victory. Delbruck says:

> It is the principal task of the commander to devote his entire mental powers and energy to gaining for his own army the greatest possible advantages in the decisive action and to make his victory as great as possible.[11]

The enemy army is the objective of this strategy. The commander must constantly seek and engage the enemy army in order to defeat it.

The strategy of exhaustion--ermattungsstrategie--is a two-pole strategy of battle and maneuver. Delbruck states that battle is only one of the means since

> It is also possible that the opposing forces are so equal that from the start only moderate successes can be expected. One may not so much place his hopes on completely defeating the enemy as wearing him out and exhausting him by blows and destruction of all kinds to the extent that in the end he prefers to accept the condition of the victor.[12]

Limited political goals, inadequate force, insufficient resources, or lack of will can restrict a nation from pursuing a strategy of annihilation. If the decisive defeat of the enemy force, as required in the strategy of annihilation, is unlikely then the the proper strategy to pursue is one of exhaustion. Consequently, the role of battle is reduced in significance to one of several equally effective means available. The role of the commander is also unique within the dual nature of this strategy; the

commander must decide when to fight and when to maneuver. After all:

> The decision ... is a subjective one ... [only] after a careful consideration of all circumstances--the aim of the war, the combat forces, the political repercussions, the individuality of the enemy commander, and of the government and people of the enemy, as well as his own--the general must decide whether a battle is advisable or not.[13]

The objective of this strategy, as the name implies, is the exhaustion of the opponent's will to fight. This strategy is designed to bleed the enemy white. It primarily attacks the enemy's will to fight, and only secondarily his means of fighting.

The strategy that a state prosecutes is a product of the intimate relationship and relative dominance of the components within the trinity. This is true because, as Clausewitz shows, war is fueled by the passion of the people, directed through the reason and rational thought of the government, and executed in the realm of chance. friction, and fog by the military.

In order to identify the form of strategy employed by Iran and Iraq and how these strategies were the result of the nation's trinity, the war must be analyzed in its social and political context. Therefore, the trinity of the people, government, and army of Iran and Iraq will be examined to determine their influence on the strategies pursued by the two belligerents.

III STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

The hatred between Iran and Iraq is both long-standing
and deep running. "This is one of the world's oldest
conflicts across a primarily racial divide"[14] with the chasm
between the two countries representing "one of the great
ethnic and cultural divides on the earth's surface."[15]
While the historic causes fueled the smoldering hatred
between between the two states, the Iranian revolution
provided the spark that exploded the rivalry into war.

> The stage setting for the Iran-Iraq war therefore
> was complete long before the hostilities began.
> After Khomeini returned to Iran, his Islamic
> revolution became an issue of growing concern to
> Iraqi leaders and to Arab moderates throughout the
> Middle East. The conflict between the two
> ideologies was a war for minds, fought initially
> with the symbols of identification--whether
> ethnic, religious, or nationalistic--that were
> readily available to all participants.[16]

The outbreak of war in September 1980 was the result of
ancient religious, ethnic, and territorial disputes
exacerbated by incompatible, post-revolution ideologies and
regional ambitions. The causes of the war fall primarily
within two components of the trinity: the domain of passion
and emotion of the people; and, the domain of reason and
rational thought of the government. An analysis of these
causes is essential to understanding the genesis of the war.

The border dispute between Iran and Iraq is the first
source of hostility between the two governments. It has its
origins over 300 years ago. In 1638 the Ottoman Sultan
drove the Persians out of Baghdad. In 1639 the Treaty of

Zuhab was signed outlining the Ottoman-Persian border.

However, the borders reflected tribal regions,

> rather than precise geographic boundary
> lines...the Ottomans and the Persians left a vague
> 200 kilometer wide zone from the Zagros Mountains
> in the north to the gulf.[17]

The treaty stood without major change for 200 years.

Minor disputes over the years were mediated and settled. However, as the economic significance of the Shatt al-Arab waterway increased, so did the intensity of the disagreements. Both sides claimed sovereignty over the waterway and in 1969 both renounced existing treaties. In 1975, faced with a direct military confrontation with the militarily superior Shah, Iraq acquiesced and signed the Algiers Agreement.

The Algiers Agreement in 1975 temporarily eased the tension between Iran and Iraq and addressed several key historical problems between the two countries. While the Shatt al-Arab waterway and Kurdish insurgency problems[18] were settled, "there seems to be little doubt which party to the Algiers Agreement made the most concessions."[19] Facing an expensive Kurdish rebellion that threatened his regime and confronting Iranian military superiority, "Saddam Hussein accepted the 1975 agreement under substantial duress."[20] Iraq was compelled to surrender its control of the strategic Shatt al-Arab, its sole access to the Gulf, for promises of Iranian non-interference in Iraqi domestic affairs. This accord was critical to Iraq since Iran would now end its substantial aid to Kurdish insurgents in Iraq.

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Tensions between the governments of Iran-Iraq over the Kurds became more heated in the early 1970's. The Shah heavily supported the Kurdish rebellion placing a significant drain on Iraqi finances and domestic programs.

> Within the context of Iran-Iraq tensions, however, the Shah of Iran with American agreement chose to give limited support to the Iraqi Kurds beginning in 1972. Iranian support gradually increased prior to Iraq's 1975 settlement with Iran, contributing to heavy losses on both sides.[21]

After the agreement was signed, ending Iranian aid, the Iraqi Army "eliminated Kurdish resistance in only two weeks, an indicator of the level of the Shah's support during the preceding two years."[22]

However, following the Iranian Revolution, Iran renewed its interference in Iraq's domestic affairs. The Shiite underground movements in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds received substantial moral and material support from Iran. In the spring of 1980 the Iraqi Shiite al Da'awa Party initiated acts of terrorism including the attempted assassination of Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. This coincided with Iran's declaration that "it was Iran's policy to topple the government in Baghdad."[23] Iraq, for its part, responded with renewed repression of Shiite opposition including the April 1980 execution of Baqr Sadr, the leading Iraqi Shiite leader, and expelled 100,000 Iranians and 200,000 Shiite Kurds to Iran. The Iraqis also reinforced resistance to the Iranian leadership by supporting Communist and Kurdish opponents to the regime and the Arab population of Khuzistan. The propaganda war intensified. Khomeini called

upon the people of Iraq to "Wake up and topple this corrupt regime in your Islamic country before it is too late."[24] Hussein responded with similar attacks on the Islamic regime. This active mutual support of subversion coupled with fierce propaganda campaigns exacerbated the deep animosity between the two states.

The competing ideologies of the two regimes is the first source of conflict between the governments that is a direct result of the revolution. The animosity between the Iraqis and the revolutionary Iran "reflected a fundamental incompatibility between Arab Nationalism and Islamic conservatism."[25] Arab nationalists believe that Arabism is the common denominator that unites people regardless of religion. This is in direct contradiction to the Islamic fundamentalist notion that Islamic people are one nation regardless of geography and ethnic composition. Iran directly challenged the Arab Nationalist premise upon which the Iraqi leadership based the legitimacy of their rule.

> Khomeini believed that the ultimate aim of Islam was to abolish nationality; and therefore Arab nationalism was fundamentally opposed to Islam because it hindered the ability of Islam to act as a uniting force.[26]

This attitude represented a direct threat to the Iraqi leadership since "in a country like Iraq, which is composed of diverse religious sects and ethnic groups, Arab nationalism and Iraqi patriotism are essential for the country's survival."[27] Iran's call for a Jihad (holy war)

to overthrow the "illegitimate" Iraqi leadership was a dagger aimed at the heart of Iraq.

As both nations attempted to exert dominance over the region, the radically divergent ideologies resulted in direct political conflict. Saddam Hussein claimed the role of regional leader in the name of Arab nationalism and saw the conflict with Iran "...as Arab nationalism locked in a struggle with Persian racism."[28] Hussein saw his role as twofold: protector of their regime; and, as the self-anointed regional Arab leader, defender of the Arab interests in the Gulf. However, Iran saw their claim to regional leadership with equal legitimacy. In Khomeini's mind:

> The revolutionary dimension of Iran's foreign policy which follows from this ideological outlook claims the right to intervene at will in a much wider, multinational constituency and to project its message over the heads of existing governments.[29]

This was a direct challenge to Hussein's claim of leadership in a united Arab world and protector of the Gulf.

The religious cleavage between the two major Islamic sects has historically divided the people of Iran and Iraq. The Shiite sect was born in a bitter succession dispute within the Muslim community around 680 A.D. Since then, the Sunnis have flourished and have become numerically dominant. Shiite forces gained control of Persia in 1501 and have remained in control. Iraqi leadership has been dominated since the sixteenth century by Sunnis. They are, however, faced with a 55 percent Shiite majority, and "as minority

rulers, the Sunni Arabs are obsessed with the prospect of losing power to the Shias."[30] Therefore, the historic animosity between Sunni and Shiite is significant and pervasive. Sheikh R. Ali believes "it is this Shiite-Sunnite schism that is at the heart of the religion and sectarian dispute between Iran and Iraq".[31]

The Persian-Arab racial conflict is the another source of hostility between the Iraqi and Iranian people. This problem originated in the clashes between the Persian and Ottoman empires. The Iraqi sense of Arab racial superiority exacerbates the dispute. This is illustrated by Ali when he says:

> The Muslims in general and Arabs in particular revere and respect the Arabic language -- the language of the Holy Book (the Qur'am). No such reverence could be claimed for Farsi.[32]

Since Islam originated in Arabia, most Arabs, especially Iraqi Arabs, view the Iranians as "inferior and second-class Muslims."[33] Naturally, the Iranians with their proud and ancient Persian civilization greatly resent this condescending attitude.

The Iranian Revolution, added the spark to an already volatile situation. It exacerbated a deep and long-running hostility between the people and governments of Iran and Iraq and reinforced Iraq's paranoia.

THE DECISION

The decision for war was based on the premise that the Iranian trinity was in shambles. The revolution had appeared to destroy the Iranian army and push it into chaos.

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Khomeini's weak government seemed incapable of consolidating power or holding the country together. The people were in open revolt and bitterly divided in their support for Khomeini's government. No element or combination of elements within the trinity seemed capable of countering Iraqi strengths.

The army of the Shah had been decapitated by repeated purges, depleted by rampant desertion, and virtually disarmed by neglected maintenance and logistical support. One of Khomeini's first acts upon seizing power was to purge the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces which he accurately assessed to be a bastion of monarchist support. Despite this order he realized he needed a strong military to maintain his tenuous hold on power and suppress rival factions and separatist groups. Khomeini had to balance the requirement for a viable military with the need to eliminate Shah loyalists. Therefore, instead of indiscriminate purging, a more surgical approach was initially required. Accordingly, the first of two purges, conducted from February to September 1979, was designed to remove from power only those senior officers whose loyalty to the new regime was questionable. The second purge, from September 1979 to the Iraqi invasion a year later, reflected Khomeini's increased confidence in his control over the government and, concurrently, a decreased dependence on the military as an agent of control. As a result, this purge was more widespread and centered on lower-ranking officer

echelons.[34] The purges had "a devastating effect on the army's ability to conduct combat operations."[35] Compounding the problem, early in the revolution Khomeini had called for the military to desert and join the revolution. The strength of the armed forces fell precipitously. The largely conscript army shrank from a strength of 285,000 to 100,000 with similar mass exodus occurring in the Air Force and Navy.

Another result of the revolution manifested in the military was rampant indiscipline. As one author says, "despite the best efforts of the new military leaders to exert control in this chaotic period...the military was paralyzed by dissent and a breakdown in discipline".[36] Revolutionary councils, emerged at military posts intent upon controlling the military and "severely crippled the concept of command authority."[37] Although Khomeini sought to mitigate the damage, the armed forces were severely weakened from within.

As the moral and physical strength of the armed forces deteriorated, so did the quality of the equipment. Defense spending was cut to 60 percent of the pre-revolutionary level. The areas that bore the brunt of the budget reduction were sustainment and maintenance. Iran's ability to supply and maintain its forces was also devastated by its estrangement from its former Western military suppliers (most notably the U.S.) and its ideological isolation from its neighbors.[38] Slashed defense spending and isolation

from the countries needed for spare parts and ammunition
resupply crippled Iran's sustainment capability throughout
the war.

The Iranian government was fragmented by a
revolutionary power struggle between competing groups. The
fundamentalist hard-liners, moderates, monarchists, and
communists were all fighting for power. Exacerbating the
struggle was the presence of a restive and divided people.
Autonomy was demanded in the Arab-majority Khuzistan
province with large scale protests and demonstrations. In
March 1979, fighting broke out between government forces and
Kurdish separatist forces. "It was Khomeini's immense
prestige, power, influence and political acumen that held
the Islamic Republic together during 1979, and until
September 1980".[39] His hold was tenuous and threatened in a
bitterly divided and factionally separated society.

In summary, the trinity of the Iranian society appeared
to be in absolute chaos. The people, whose passion and
national will are necessary for fueling a war, were in
disunity. The military, critical to executing a war
strategy, was morally, cybernetically and physically
weakened. And the government, responsible for providing
rational direction to a war, was fragmented with an
irrational, religious fanatic as its leader.

This was the situation that confronted Iraq. The time
appeared right for an easy victory over a weakened bitter
enemy.

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> Looking eastwards across his frontier, President
> Saddam Hussein saw a chaotic situation in Iran
> with a weak, divided central authority; several
> factions struggling against each other for power
> or to obtain more power; terrorism rampant in the
> capital and main cities; and decapitated and
> depleted Armed Forces, demoralized and cowering in
> the barracks. He calculated that this was the
> most opportune moment to strike.[40]

The apparent strength of the Iraqi trinity was in sharp contrast to the chaotic Iranian situation. The military was undeniably superior to Iran's, the government was unified under the firm hand of Hussein, and the people, although a major concern of the regime, were still firmly under control.

Hussein was justifiably confident in his military's relative superiority to the Iranian military. By mid-1980, the Iraqi armed forces were larger and in better fighting condition than at anytime before. Defense spending in 1979--$2.02 billion--had been the highest ever and morale had never been better. The readiness and strength of the armed forces was far superior to that of the enemy.[41]

The people presented the most troublesome component of the Iraqi trinity. Hussein maintained control over a society that is 55 percent Shiite Moslem and 20 percent non-Arabic Kurds through "fear and favor--strings that Hussein played with virtuosity..."[42] He purged the nation of possible religious troublemakers (100,000 Iranians and 200,000 Shiites) and maintained control through the five separate Iraqi security forces. Dissent and opposition were crushed. He has also tried to build a broad base of support

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by using Iraq's substantial oil income to provide the material needs for his people.[43] Through a "carrot and stick" policy Hussein had retained tight control over the Iraqi people.

The government was also firmly supportive of Hussein. The leading government officials, like the key military leaders, were "drawn from the president's own network of clan and blood loyalties in the Takrit region north of Baghdad."[44] Therefore, the government was absolutely loyal to Saddam Hussein.

In summary, the dissimilar condition of the trinities of Iran and Iraq convinced Saddam Hussein that a window of opportunity existed. Accordingly "Iraq felt that the best way to contain the Iranian threat was to take advantage of its temporary strategic superiority".[45] Hussein prepared Iraq for war with Iran.

IV CHRONOLOGY

PRE WAR DISPOSITIONS

On the eve of the war it was obvious from the Iranian force deployments that they did not anticipate an Iraqi invasion (see map 2, page 43). Iran's attention was focused elsewhere. It feared Soviet invasion from Transcaucasia in the north and Afghanistan in the east. It faced internal unrest in Baluchistan and along the Pakistani border. And it expected another American raid on Tehran to rescue the hostages.[46] Consequently, only four of Iran's nine

understrength army divisions were defending its border with
Iraq.

By September 1980 Iranian ground forces had developed
into three separate organizations[47]: "the understrength but
relatively well-equipped divisions of the regular army,
units of the hastily mustered Revolutionary Guards (the
Pasradan), and Khomeini's's 'Army of Twenty Million' (the
Baseeji)."[48] The three different armed forces were in
varying states of development controlled by and loyal to
different factions within Iran. As a result, at the outset
of the war, they were an uncoordinated and disjointed force.

The strategic objective of the Iraqi invasion was the
overthrow of the Khomeini regime. This was based on a
fundamental assumption. The Iraqis believed "a well-timed
blow would shatter Khomeini's fragile regime, forcing the
old man to sue for peace on Iraqi terms, or perhaps even
forcing him out of power completely".[49] Elements within the
Iranian trinity were expected to directly contribute to the
Iraqi objective. First, the various dissatisfied ethnic
groups among the Iranian people--the Khuzistan Arabs, the
Baluchis, and the Azerbaijanis--would take advantage of the
invasion to overthrow the oppressive Khomeini regime.
Second, the strong royalist and nationalist forces in the
armed forces would likewise attempt to overthrow Khomeini
and seize power. And, third, the rival factions within the
government, the moderates and communists, would also attempt
to capitalize on the attack and overthrow Khomeini.

THE FIRST PHASE: INVASION

Iraq's operational objectives were limited and terrain-oriented. In the early hours of 22 September 1980, Iraq launched its invasion (see Map 3, page 44) across a 450-mile front on four axes. From North to South these were:

--In the Qasr Sherin area in order to seize the town and its vital road junction, and to block any Iranian counter-attack routes into the Iraqi internal road system.

--In the Mehran area, to secure the Iranian Frontier Road and block Iranian counter-attack routes.

--In the southern Khuzistan Province to seize the towns of Susangerdand Ahwaz, secure the line of low hills and dunes on the east side of the Karun River, and interdict and besiege the garrison town of Dezful.

--In the Khorramshahr and Abadan area to bulldoze a way through the oil complexes and occupy Abadan island.

The main attack along the two southern axis and was weighted with two mechanized and three armored divisions. The division-sized supporting attacks in the north were designed to block the approaches into Baghdad.[51]

In the air, Hussein envisioned a preemptive strike on the Iranian Air Force patterned after the 1967 Israeli attack. Unfortunately, the Shah also learned from the 1967 war and had heavily invested in concrete shelters for his air force. The Iraqi strike was inconsequential. As a result, the air forces played an insignificant part in this initial phase of the war.

On the ground, the Iraqi spearheads easily swept aside Iranian defenders and thrust almost 50 miles into Iran in the first several days (see map 4, page 45). The attack in the north secured the critical terrain forward of Qasr Sherin and positioned forces to block any Iranian counterattack toward Baghdad. The next axis, farther south, secured Mehran on the evening of 22 September. The forces then pushed eastward to the foothills of the Zagros Mountains securing the important road network and effectively blocking any Iranian attack from west of the Zagros toward the approaches to Baghdad. The two southern axis of the main attack met with mixed results. The thrust into southern Khuzistan against Susangerd, Ahwaz and Dezful was unsucessful. It stalled short of Ahwaz and Dezful creating a salient at Susangerd. The southernmost, and more successful, axis quickly bypassed and isolated Khorramshahr and Abadan. the major Iranian oil refining complex and terminal.

The Iranian forces, while better than expected. were only marginally effective. The brunt of the fighting was carried by the Pasradan and Baseeji thereby further damaging the army's standing. Each of the three ground forces planned and conducted independent operations without orchestration at the operational level. The Pasradan were ineffective in the open terrain and it was only in the urban battles for Khorramshahr and Abadan that they achieved any success. The Pasradan's aggressive and effective fighting

in Khorramshahr combined with Iraqi reluctance to accept the

high casualties of house-to-house urban fighting prolonged

the siege of that area until it fell on 10 November.

On 28 September, in his "Address to the Nation", Saddam

Hussein announced that the territorial objectives of the

invasion had been achieved and Iraq was prepared to cease

hostilities and negotiate a settlement. Although Iraq had

gained control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, blocked any

potential Iranian threat to Baghdad, and cut-off the

Khorramshahr-Abadan oil facility, the announcement was

somewhat premature. For, in the opinion of Mark Heller, the

invasion:

> was a failure in the strategic sense. The Iranian
> Air Force was untouched and the Army was spared
> the brunt of the Iraqi blow, the Arab population
> of Khuzistan did not welcome the Iraqi invaders as
> liberators, and [most significantly], the
> resurgence of nationalist sentiment and religious
> zeal in response to the Iraqi attack enabled the
> Iranian regime to carry out a difficult and
> protracted war.[52]

Also, the Iraqis found the Iranians in greater strength and

spirit than anticipated. The Iranian army had gained

limited experience in quelling recent disturbances and was

eager to prove its worth and remove the stigma of being an

instrument of the Shah. The tenacity and revolutionary

ardor of the Pasradan and Baseeji more than compensated for

their lack of sufficient training and organization. Their

willingness to accept death as martyrs unnerved the Iraqis.

The surprising physical and moral strength of the Iranian

forces demonstrated they were a stronger foe than anticipated.

The Iraqis had been expected to "quickly capitalize on the internal difficulties characterizing Iran in mid-1980 and move quickly to consolidate their gains."[53] It was critical that the victory be swift and overwhelming. Therefore, for its military strategy to be consistent with its strategic objective, Iraq should have executed a strategy of annihilation. Hussein should have quickly sought Iran's main force, defeated it, and followed up the victory until Khomeini's regime was removed.

Saddam Hussein's failure to do this has been "what outside observers considered an anomaly in Iraqi strategy in the early phases of the war, namely the pursuit of only limited objectives".[54] The limited objectives of Iraq's invasion, with the ensuing surrender of the initiative to Iran, allowed Iran to dictate the course of the war and set the battlefield conditions throughout the majority of the remainder of the war. It placed Hussein and Iraq in an unwinnable position--involved in a protracted war of exhaustion against a foe better suited, numerically and spiritually, for that form of war. Hussein had failed to properly match his political objective to the appropriate military strategy. This was manifested in the limited, territorially-oriented operational objectives of the invasion.

As Delbruck states, the total destruction of the
enemy's forces or the occupation of his territory is not
required in the strategy of annihilation. The military
superiority required in the strategy of annihilation must
only be sufficient to ensure that first, decisive victory.
In this regard Iraq could have executed this strategy since:

> in the summer of 1980 it enjoyed an undeniable
> military edge over its rival. Iraq's grand
> strategy did not fail because its military power
> was insufficient to attain its national goals, but
> because it did not make more demands on it.[55]

Therefore, Iraq possessed the military power necessary to
have properly executed a strategy of annihilation at the
outset of the war, but it failed to properly match its
operational means to its strategic ends.

This failure, as manifested in the limited military
objectives, was a product of the Iraqi trinity. Christine
Helms, in her article on Iraq's early war performance,
attributes the decision to limit the military objectives to
the relationship of the military, government, and people of
Iraq. Helms contends that the purely military reasons
proposed by Hussein--overextended LOC's, Iran's aggressive
defense, and Iraq's inexperience in protracted wars--present
an insufficient explanation. She believes that "Iraq's
restraint of its military was intentional, indicative of an
overall military strategy heavily constrained by the
political objectives of the Baath Party."[55] First, the
government's structure was overly centralized, designed for
domestic policy decisions and incapable of the independent

and rapid decision-making required in war. And second, one
of the government's primary aims was to minimize Iraqi
casualties. Iraq could not afford to lose large numbers of
troops nor suffer large losses within any of its numerous
sectarian groups. So, the influence of the Iraqi trinity
was significant in limiting their military objectives.

Iran, surprised strategically by the invasion,
obviously did not possess a war strategy at the outset of
the war. However, several characteristics of its early
reaction indicate a developing strategy. First, early on,
Iran "rapidly escalated the war [to total war] by extending
it to Iraqi cities and targets of value".[57] Second, the
acceptance of high casualties defending Khorramshahr
indicated the Iranian government's determination to use its
three to one manpower superiority to its strategic
advantage. It intended to bleed Iraq to death. Third, and
most important, Iran's fierce defense demonstrated a
remarkable Iranian national will. For devout Muslims, death
in battle for Islam is martyrdom which assures one's entry
into heaven. This belief allowed the Pasradan to sustain
heavy losses and withstand repeated attacks and ceaseless
shelling by superior forces. For the less devout, a strong
sense of nationalism motivated them during their tenacious
fight against the Iraqi invaders. These two factors, "which
generally had not been recognized in Western analyses of
Iran's military capabilities against Iraq, proved decisive
in the first phase of the evolution of the Iranian military

during the war".[58] Therefore, the national will of the
people--the fuel of the war--emerged early in the war as a
great source of Iranian strength.

So, in the first stage of the war we see emergent
indicators of Iranian strategy. Iran was determined to
escalate the war from one of limited objectives to a total
war by extending the theater of war in length and depth.
This, coupled with the strong Iranian national will and
numerical superiority indicated that Iran had the capacity
to fight a protracted war of exhaustion. The Iranian
trinity, dominated by the passion of the people, had
coalesced with remarkable strength.

THE SECOND PHASE: STATIC WAR

The static nature of this phase of the war was a result
of the trinities of both countries. This second stage of
the war was characterized by a series of inconclusive
battles lasting from November 1980 until September 1981.

The Iraqi decision to go on the operational defensive
was deliberate.

> Although Saddam Hussein did not announce Iraq's
> resort to a defensive strategy until 7 December
> 1980, the strategy from mid-October onwards, and
> particularly after the fall of Khorramshahr [24-5
> October 1980], was in effect one of static war
> which aimed at retaining captured territories.[59]

Only minor ground operations were conducted during this
phase. They were primarily designed to consolidate gains
and make minor improvements to the Iraqi positions.

The Iranian's sought to improve their defenses while
intensively preparing for an upcoming offensive. On 5

October 1980 an Iranian armored division attempted to
penetrate the Iraqi lines in the vicinity of Susangerd. It
was initially successful, penetrating deep into the Iraqi
rear. But the Iraqis managed to contain, envelop, and
destroy the spearhead in several days with heavy Iranian
losses.[60]

The analysis of the two trinities reveals the causes
for the stalemate. First, in Iran's case, the government
became the dominant component of the trinity. It determined
Iranian actions in this phase. The ideological power
struggle for control of the government "dominated the second
phase of the war [and] the struggle was manifested in a
seven month stalemate on the battle front."[61] As factions
jockeyed for power, the front remained generally static.
Bani Sadr, the head of the moderate faction and the Prime
Minister of Iran, aligned himself with the military in an
attempt to strengthen his position. His main opposition,
the more radical clerics, favored the Pasradan. Eventually,
the fundamentalist element emerged more powerful,
overwhelming the moderates. As the result "the regular
armed forces were further eclipsed in terms of regime favor
and resource allocation by the Revolutionary Guards
(Pasradan)".[62] The military stalemate reflected an Iranian
government paralyzed by this internal power struggle.

Early in the war, two major flaws in the Iranian
military emerged: operational limitations resulting from
the lack of spare parts and supplies and a lack of

operational coordination of the ground forces. The

sustainment problem plagued Iran throughout the war. Iran

felt the coordination problem could be fixed with the

creation of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC). However,

"because of ideological split the SDC was unable to reach

agreement on many issues..."[53] The split in the SDC

reflected the ongoing struggle for control of the

government.

In the case of Iraq, the government, as embodied in

Saddam Hussein, was the dominant component of the trinity.

Faced with the dilemma of being trapped in a protracted

stalemate against an implacable foe or surrender, Hussein

revised Iraq's strategy. Realizing he could not win the war

in battle alone, since the decisive defeat of Iranian forces

on the battlefield was an impossible goal, Hussein decided

to pursue a strategy of exhaustion. He withdrew his forces

to better defensible terrain and relied upon the inherent

advantages of the defender and his more mobile forces to

inflict staggering losses on Iran.

Many observers felt this strategy was a mistake. Iran

was presumed to be demographically and spiritually better

suited to a war of exhaustion. However, under the present

circumstances, Hussein had to accept that risk. He was

convinced that ending the war after the inconclusive attack

would fatally weaken public support for his government.

THE THIRD PHASE: IRAN SEIZES THE INITIATIVE

The third phase of the war began in September 1981 with an offensive designed to regain lost Iranian territory. Iran successfully attacked in Operation Thamin al-Aimma to relieve the seize of Abadan. After three days of heavy fighting a combined Army-Pasradan force pushed the Iraqis across the Karun river and lifted the siege of Abadan on 29 September. Operation "Jerusalem Way" (29 Nov - 7 Dec) was an ambitious multi-division offensive in the Bostan-Susangerd area. It resulted in heavy casualties for both sides, Iraqi retreat and redeployment, and Iran securing of Bostan.

After a lull imposed by the winter rains, Iran resumed its offensive in March 1982 with an attack in the Shush-Dezful area. Operation "Undeniable Victory" involved a total of 120,000 troops on both sides and was the largest campaign of the war. Iran attacked with four divisions (40 -50,000 troops) and some 30,000 Pasradan. Iraq defended with the Fourth Army (four divisions with a total of 40,000 troops). Iraq was forced to withdraw and redeploy along the original Iran-Iraq border.

The next Iranian offensive, "Operation Jerusalem", was the most sophisticated Iranian offensive to date.

> Using a mixture of regular army and Pasradan within flexible battle plans which combined classical maneuver with guerrilla-type tactics, Iran launched a three-pronged attack on Iraqi strongholds in Khuzistan.[54]

The success of this operation pushed Iraqi forces out of the Ahvas-Susangerd area. On 20 May, the Iranians prepared for an attack to seize Khorramshahr. Fearing a costly fight in the city, Hussein withdrew his forces after deciding that politically and militarily he could not afford the losses. This phase of the war ended with the victorious Iranians regaining the city with little resistance on 25 May 1982 (see map, page 46).

The Iranian offensives reflected several trends that must have encouraged the clerics in Tehran. First, the military began to show surprising competence and emerged as an effective fighting force. The Iranians demonstrated an improved ability to plan and execute large military operations. The major reasons for this transformation were:

> the elimination of the conflicting guidance given the military as a result of the power struggle; resolution, however tenuous, of the bitter disputes between the army and the Revolutionary Guards, which resulted in increased cooperation and joint operations; and improved tactics, intelligence, and planning on the part of the military.[65]

The other trend that developed was the successful use of "human wave" attacks. Usually these attacks paved the way for regular army assaults and greatly contributed to the successful offensives in 1982. The Iranian casualty rate was appalling. By the end of 1983, 300,000 Iranians had been killed in comparison to 65,000 Iraqis. However, while Iran was absorbing the greater losses, it was Iraq who was feeling the manpower crunch. Despite these staggering

casualty rates, the war was tilting inexorably in Iran's favor. Khomeini's strategy of bleeding Iraq was working.

Again, the actions of the belligerent were a result of the two national trinities. Iran, after recovering from the initial shock of the Iraqi invasion, announced a broader set of goals and stuck with them throughout the remainder of the war. They demanded the following:

> the removal of Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party from Power; the admission of aggression by Iraq; the repatriation of about 100,000 Shiite Arabs of Iranian extraction previously expelled by Hussein; and reparations for the cost of the war (demands have ranged from $50 to $150 billion).[55]

While Khomeini expanded the Iranian war aims, he chose the strategy of exhaustion as the way of achieving these ends.

This decision was based upon his analysis of the state of the Iranian trinity. First, the Iranian military was unable to match the qualitatively superior Iraqi forces. However, in the Regular Army, the Pasradan, and the Baseeji, Iran possessed a numerically superior and more ideologically committed force. Prudent application of this force could exploit Iraq's lack of strategic depth and inferior numerical strength and would tell over time.

Second, Khomeini used the war to consolidate his power. A protracted "Holy War" would obviously rally the people to his government and occupy the attentions of his rivals.

> There were no internal constraints imposed on the time frame of the Iranian government. If two potentially disaffected groups--a growing number of unemployed and military--could be kept preoccupied, then to prolong the fighting was to

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the advantage of the new Iranian leadership in Tehran.[57]

Third, the people dramatically demonstrated an astonishing willingness to resist the invasion at any cost.

> A combination of religious fervor and deep-rooted nationalistic feeling has so far enabled Iran, without major allies, to sustain a costly stalemate on the battlefront as well as economic hardships.[68]

The Iranian people demonstrated total disregard for life in their desire to become martyrs for Islam. This provided a seemingly inexhaustable fuel for the war.

Therefore, a strategy of exhaustion and a protracted war were primarily a result of the influence of the government and the people of Iran. This strategy served Khomeini's needs by fully institutionalizing the revolution, unifying the people behind the regime, and silencing the opposition.

In Iraq, the government and the people were the dominant components. Hussein pursued a "guns and butter" domestic policy to maintain the loyalty of the Iraqi people. He used Iraq's substantial oil wealth to finance both the war and welfare and public works programs. By providing for the material needs of his people he attempted to insulate them from any consumer hardships caused by the war. However, to further add to the problems of Saddam Hussein, Syria closed its borders to Iraq and cut off the flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean oil terminal. This severely reduced

Iraqi oil revenues, forced Hussein to impose economic austerity programs, and impacted on his "guns and butter" domestic policy. Faced with military reverses, unacceptable casualty rates, and economic problems, Hussein again sought peace.

> The war was evolving into a terrific pounding match, with the Iraqis on an increasingly hard-pressed defensive. Apparently, as a result of a major review of the Iraqi war aims, Saddam Hussein announced in late June that all Iraqi forces would withdraw from Iranian territory -- a tacit admission that the war was unwinnable.[69]

Iran rejected this proposal placing Saddam Hussein in a dilemma. For while he realized that he was engaged in a war that was no longer winnable, acceptance of Iran's demands for peace would result in the destruction of his government. He decided that the one course of action that he had was to keep fighting in order to avoid defeat.

THE FOURTH PHASE: OPERATIONAL STALEMATE

During this, the longest stage of the war, running from July 1982 until late 1987, the military situation evolved into an operational stalemate. The Iranians launched several costly large-scale offensives that achieved little. Operation Kherbar in February-March 1984 resulted in a minor Iranian advance across the border to the north of Basra. Operation Badr in March 1985 was a major Iranian push also towards Basra with only minor success.

In early 1986, Iran launched "Operation Dawn VIII" which breached Iraqi lines at several points and resulted in the capture of Fao Peninsula. This limited success

temporarily enhanced flagging Iranian morale and increased
the government's confidence. The setback was a heavy blow
to both Iraqi morale and the prestige of Saddam Hussein and
his Baath regime. Faced with an operational stalemate on
the ground, Hussein attempted to attack Iran's strength--its
national will--through an air campaign designed "to
undermine the moral and material base of Iran's war
effort."[70] Massive air operations were carried out against
the Kharg Island oil terminal and against population centers
(including Tehran). These attacks, throughout the depth of
Iran, produced favorable results. Opponents of the Khomeini
regime and its war policy began expressing their opposition
publicly. Major demonstrations took place with opponents to
the war calling for its end.

> In short, Iraqi counter-attrition was able to
> impose heavy economic costs on Iran, including
> shortages of basic commodities, and to produce
> expressions of war-weariness in Iran, including
> public opposition and greater resistance to
> conscription, to the point where Iranian leaders
> made domestic unity the central theme of their
> public utterances.[71]

Iran responded with air and missile attacks on Iraqi cities.
However, these attacks were not as decisive as the Iraqi
attacks. The "War of the Cities" had significant impact on
Iranian physical and moral strength, and it was decisive in
turning the war in Iraq's favor and helping Hussein avoid
defeat.

Also, during this phase of the war, Iraqi morale and
national will of the people improved and was reflected in
the more professional performance of the army.

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> Once Iraq was no longer operating in foreign
> territory but rather defending its own homeland,
> the nation became more unified in its support for
> the government, and the armed forces regained
> their fighting spirit.[72]

Iraq's ability to exploit the natural advantages of the
defender, minimize casualties, and exhaust Iran's ability to
fuel--both materially and spiritually--the protracted war
forced Iran on the strategic defensive.

Again, the dynamics of the "paradoxical trinity" were
manifested on the battlefield. For Iran, the operations
during this phase represented a fundamental shift in tactics
as a result of the influence of a component of the trinity.
The domestic impact of their incredibly high casualty rates
resulted in the abandonment of costly human wave attacks.
This was significant since it signaled the Iranian
recognition of the limits of a critical component of the
trinity--the will and passion of the people. Until this
time the Islamic and revolutionary fervor and surprising
Iranian nationalism combined to form a burning national will
that dominated the Iranian trinity. For the majority of the
war, the passion of the people allowed Iran to pursue its
costly strategy of exhaustion. This change to a more
conventional operational plan "reflected the regime's
awareness of both the futility of human-wave tactics and the
growing war-weariness in Iran".[73]

THE FIFTH PHASE: THE ROAD TO PEACE

As the "War of the Cities" continued to exhaust Iran's
moral strength and the "Tanker War" drained its economic

trength, Iran's military strength began to fail. In April
1988 Iraq, on the offensive for the first time since the
invasion eight years before, attacked with the Seventh
Armored Corps and the elite Presidential Guard. The assault
regained the Fao Peninsula. This loss was a further blow to
Iranian morale, one followed a day later by the virtual
destruction of the Iranian Navy in a short confrontation
with the U.S. Navy. Finally, Iranian forces were expelled
from a salient east of Basra in "just five hours, with the
Iranians putting up only token resistance".[74] Iran was
clearly on the strategic and operational defensive and close
to exhaustion.

The military losses coincided with political setbacks
to the fundamentalist hard-liners in the June 1988
elections. The military setbacks increased tensions between
radical and moderate factions among the ruling mullahs and
led to Khomeini relinquishing his title of Commander in
Chief to the more pragmatic Hasheim Rafsanjani who was known
to want an end to the war.

In the end, "with a huge western fleet patrolling its
shores, a superior Iraqi Army inflicting unbearable
punishment and Arab rejection of its Islamic appeal, Iran's
choice narrowed to one option: abandoning the war".[75] On 18
July 1988 Iran said it was willing to accept a United
Nations sponsored cease fire. In order to save the
revolution, Khomeini had to accept his only option and
abandon the "Holy" war.

In summary, the government of Iran, operating in the realm of rational thought and reason, recognized the limits of an exhausted army and national will. Khomeini admitted Iran's goals were unattainable and ended the war.

V CONCLUSION

The analysis of the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates the inextricable link between the paradoxical trinity of a state and that state's strategy and actions in war. Accordingly, both Iran and Iraq, with their diametrically opposed governments, diverse and historically hostile people, and radically different armies, pursued strategies based on the different tensions within their respective trinities.

After Iran recovered from the initial shock of the invasion the tensions within the Iranian trinity dictated that it pursue a strategy of exhaustion. After the invasion, the surprising nationalism and religious fervor of the Iranians propelled the people to dominance within the trinity. The strength of Iran's remarkable national will coupled with its large population and relatively weak military compelled it to pursue a strategy of exhaustion. Conversely, when the passion of the people was exhausted, the government was forced to accept its only option--the decision to abandon the war.

Similarly, the Iraqi war effort was dictated by the relationship of the components within the Iraqi trinity. Iraq's assessment of the Iranian trinity and its perceived

relative military dominance resulted in the decision for war and shaped its strategy. However, Iraq's initial strategy of annihilation was flawed. While it possessed the requisite military strength, it failed to attack to destroy the Iranian army. Limited, terrain-oriented objectives were imposed by the government's concern for the impact that a strategy of annihilation would have on the people. The fear that high casualty rates would destroy the people's support of a minority government constrained Hussein's actions. After the unsuccessful invasion, the Iraqi society coalesced; demonstrating a strong nationalism and will to fight. The strength of both the people and the military allowed Hussein to pursue a strategy of exhaustion. In the end, this relationship within Iraq's trinity resulted in a successful strategy of exhaustion.

While Clausewitz's trinity is a valid analytical tool for explaining how states act in war, it has never been proposed as a predictive tool. The Iran-Iraq War does not reveal a clear answer to the question of its utility before the fact to predict victory or defeat. An analysis of the pre-war Iranian trinity appeared to indicate a swift Iraqi victory, but the ensuing protracted, bloody struggle seems to invalidate this concept as a predictive tool. However, Iran was in the throes of a revolution. The relationship between the components of its trinity was too unsettled to accurately predict how Iran would react in war. The dynamic nature of the revolutionary Iranian society produced an

impenetrable "fog". Therefore, this study suggests that while Clausewitz's trinity is an excellent tool for the analysis of past state behavior in war, it is unclear whether it is reliable tool for predicting future state actions in war.

This analysis also suggests several conclusions concerning Delbruck's two strategies. First, in the strategy of annihilation, the military component of the trinity is critical. This is obvious since the practitioner of this strategy must possess sufficient military strength to prevail in battle. The decisive battle (or campaign), aims at the destruction of the enemy army and is the "single pole" of this strategy. The enemy army is the only target. Economic and political targets do not have to be attacked unless they directly contribute to the defeat of the army. Therefore, the theater of war is restricted solely to the battlefield containing the opposing forces.

In a strategy of exhaustion, the people appear to be the dominant component of the trinity. This strategy is designed to exhaust the enemy and bleed him white through a variety of means. The passion and will of the people provide the fuel to sustain this struggle during what is usually a protracted war. As Iran recognized early in the war, this strategy requires a "variety of blows" and leads to the attack of all types of targets. But, once Iraq recognized this fact, it was able to attack these targets-- Iranian cities and tankers--with decisive results.

Therefore, this strategy will usually result in the
expansion of the theater in width and depth.

The government is not the dominant component in either
strategy. While it remains important in both strategies for
providing direction to the war effort, it is not the most
influential component.

In summary, the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates the validity
of Clausewitz's concept that the "paradoxical trinity"
determines a nation's strategy and actions in war. The
unique relationship between the rational thought of the
government, the passion and emotion of the people, and the
creativity of the army resulted in the strategies pursued by
Iran and Iraq.

CLAUSEWITZ'S DOMINANT TENDENCIES IN WAR
This figure is a product of seminar class discussions based
on the interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 89.

REASON - GOVERNMENT/POLICY:- Rational
thought
- National
interest
- Establishes
goals &
direction
- Counter force
to passion
and chance
- Provides
control

[Tension - not
harmony - holds
the parts
together]

PASSION - PEOPLE/EMOTION:
- Violence/enmity
- Blind natural force
- Fuels war with its
motives
- Basis of national will
- Supports or alters
government policy

CHANCE - ARMY/COMMANDER:
- Success determines
fate of govt &
people
- Allows creativity
- Operates in
climate of war
(friction/chance/
uncertainty)

-WAR IS ALWAYS COLORED ACCORDING TO THE INTENSITY OF THE
COMPONENTS
-COMPONENTS ARE ALWAYS PRESENT, BUT, PROPORTIONS CHANGE AND
RELATIONSHIPS VARY WITH CIRCUMSTANCES
-UNRESTRAINED PASSION(PEOPLE) = EXTREMES
-UNRESTRAINED ARMY = VICTORY AT ALL COSTS
-UNRESTRAINED POLICY(GOVT) = UNATTAINABLE GOALS

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MAP 1: OPERATIONAL AREA OF THE WAR
Shaheen Ayubi, The Iran-Iraq War, (New York: Praeger, 1983),
p. 33.

MAP 2: PRE-WAR DISPOSITIONS
Shaheen Ayubi, The Iran-Iraq War, (New York: Praeger, 1983),
p. 35.

Edger O'Ballance, The Gulf War, (London: Brassey's Defense
Publishers, 1988), p. 34.

Suliamaniyeh · Penjwin

Tehran

IRAN

Qasr Sherin

Naft
Shah · Sumar

· Baqubah

Bagdad

Mehran

R Tigris

Kut

Amara · · Musian

· Shush

0   100 miles

0   200 km

· Dezful

Qurnah ·

Susangerd

· Ahwaz

R Euphrates

→ Iraqi advances

▨ Iraqi occupied areas

· Darkhoven

IRAQ

· Khorramshahr

· Abadan

Basra
Umm Qasr

Fao   Shatt al-Arab

44

MAP 4: CAPTURED IRANIAN TERRITORY
Barry M. Rosen, Iran Since The Revolution, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 66.

LEGEND

— ·— · — INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

— · — · — PROVINCE BOUNDARY

IRAQI OCCUPIED TERRITORY

```
0      50    100    150
Kilometers
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MAP 5: PHASE III: IRANIAN VICTORIES

Barry M. Rosen, Iran Since The Revolution, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 70.

LEGEND

▬▬•▬▬	INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
▬•▬•▬	PROVINCE BOUNDARY
▬ ▬•▬	FRONT LINE – APRIL 1, 1982 (APPROX.)
•••••••••	FRONT LINE – NOVEMBER 1980 (APPROX.)
✦	
A	CAPTURE OF ABADAN
B	CAPTURE OF BOSTAN AREA
C	MAY ADVANCES AROUND DEZFUL
D	MAY ADVANCES AROUND KHORRAMSHAHR

0   50   100   150
Kilometers

I R A N

Mehran

Tigris

C

Dezful   Karun

al-Amara

B

Bostan

Susangerd

I R A Q

Hovaiza

K H U Z E S T A N

Hamidiyya

Ahvaz

al-Naseriyya

D

Khorramshahr

Basra

Shatt al-Arab

Abadan

A

Omm Qasr

KUWAIT

Persian Gulf

1 LTC Richard Campany, and LTC David Evans, "Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows," Proceedings, January 1985, p. 33.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

3 Ibid., p. 89.

4 Ibid., p. 89.

5 Ibid., p. 89.

6 Hans Delbruck, The History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975-1985) IV, p. 378.

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10 Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbruck and the German Military Establishment (Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1975.), p. 6.

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13 Craig, p. 273.

14 Donald Pipes, "A Border Adrift: Origins of the Conflict." in The Iran-Iraq War, ed. Shaheen Ayubi and Shirin Tahir-Kheli, (New York,NY: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 4.

15 Ibid., 4.

16 Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington,DC: Brookings Institute, 1984),p. 162.

17 John H. Sigler, "The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The tragedy of Limited Conventional Wars," International Journal, (Spring 1986), 427.

18 The origin of the Kurdish problem also predates the war by several hundred years. The vague borders laid out in the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab granted a large measure of autonomy to the Kurds. Since the creation of the Iraqi State, the Kurds

have pressed for greater autonomy and independence. In the 1960's several costly, but, unsuccessful military campaigns were launched by the Iraqi government in a futile attempt to control the Kurds

19 Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,1987), p. 12.

20 Sigler, p. 429.

21 Helms, p. 148.

22 Ibid., p. 149.

23 John Graham, "The Iran-Iraq War: Eight Years On," NATO's Sixteen Nations, (November 1987), p. 17.

24 Pipes, p. 11.

25 Helms, p. 151.

26 Ibid., p. 160.

27 Edmund Ghareeb, "The Forgotten War," American Arab Affairs, (Summer 1983), p. 63.

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29 Shahram Chubin, "The Iran-Iraq War and Persian Gulf Security," International Defense Review, (June 1984), p. 708.

30 Pipes, p. 9.

31 Sheikh R. Ali, "Holier Than Thou: The Iran-Iraq War." Middle East Review, (Fall 1984), p. 50.

32 Ibid., p. 51.

33 Ibid., p. 51.

34 The momentum of this purge was increased as a result of suspicions of military support for the failed American raid (Desert One) in April and attempted coups in June and July. At the time of the Iraqi invasion, 12000 soldiers and 9000 officers had been purged. The purged officers represented 23 percent of the total officer strength and one-half of the field grade officers. This account of the purges and their effect on the Iranian Armed Forces comes from: William F. Hickman. Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1982), p. 14.

35 Ibid., p. 18.

36 Ibid., p. 10.

37 Ibid., p. 10

38 By September 1980, Iran's 77 sophisticated F-14's were
all virtually grounded because of poor maintenance and the
operational rate of all other equipment was about 50
percent. These figures are from William O. Staudenmaier, "A
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39 Edger O'Ballance, The Gulf War, (London: Brassey's
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40 Ibid., p. 31.

41 Ibid., p. 28.

42 John Barnes, "Iraq's No-Win, No-Lose War?" U.S. News and
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43 John Barnes "Lashing Iraq's Fighting Spirit." U.S. News
and World Report, 24 February 1986, p. 43.

44 Alan Cowell, "Iraq's Dark Victory." The New York Times
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45 Karsh, p. 13.

46 Staudenmaier, p. 34.

47 In the early days of the revolution, Khomeini reasoned
that the most effective way of neutralizing the suspected
royalist army was the creation of a separate paramilitary
force that was absolutely loyal to the regime. The
Pasradan, created initially to support the various local
revolutionary committees and control the urban areas, began
assuming duties formally assigned to the army. They were
the revolutionary counter-weight to the traditional army.
They eventually gained equal status with the army and
accompanied the army to quell disturbances in Kurdistan and
Khuzistan July and September 1979.
      Consistent with the theme that all citizens are
soldiers in the revolution, and in response to the threat of
U.S. military retaliation to the hostage crisis, Khomeini
called for the creation of an "Army of Twenty Million".
Mobilization planning and military training for the
population were instituted. This account of the development
of the Iranian armed forces comes from Hickman's book, page
11.

48 Campany, p. 36.

49 Ibid., p. 36.

50 Barry M. Rosen, Iran Since the Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 67.

51 O'Ballance, pp. 33-34.

52 Mark A. Heller, "The War Strategy of Iran." Middle East Review, (Summer 1987), 17-18.

53 Christine Moss Helms, "The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Objectives Versus Military Strategy." American Arab Affairs, (Summer 1983), 78.

54 Ibid., 78.

55 Efraim Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited." International Affairs, (Winter 1987/88), p. 93.

56 Helms, "The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Objectives Versus Military Strategy," p. 79.

57 Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, p. 21.

58 Hickman, p. 20.

59 O'Ballance, p. 32.

60 100 M60 and Chieftan tanks were destroyed and 150 captured in comparison to the 50 T62's lost by Iraq.

61 Hickman, p. 22.

62 Heller, p. 18.

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64 Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, p. 24.

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66 Captain Thomas M. Daly, "The Enduring Gulf War." Proceedings, (May 1985), p. 152.

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